


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
# ON DECK

*Official Journal of the N.Z. Company of Master Mariners*

VOL. 1, NO. 2.

WELLINGTON, N.Z., NOVEMBER, 1937.

QUARTERLY.



The New Zealand Shipping Company's Motor Vessel "Rangitata."



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Registered at the G.P.O., Wellington, N.Z., for transmission through the Post as a Newspaper.

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## Our Second Voyage.

In launching this, the second number of "On Deck," we are fortified by the belief that our first venture on the seas of journalism had a fairly successful maiden voyage. Failing a full cargo of contributions, it necessarily had to carry some ballast, and it appears not to have encountered any strong squalls of criticism. The loading of this second venture has presented some difficulties, and if the little ship is not in good trim the blame must be with those of the owners who have failed to produce the goods for this present voyage.

Dropping metaphor, it can be said that "On Deck" is the official journal of the N.Z. Company of Master Mariners and, if it is to live and grow, it needs the widest support of members. One of the objects of the Company

is to watch over and safeguard the interests of Master Mariners in all matters pertaining to their profession and to give expression to the reasoned views and opinions of practical men on vital matters connected with the sea. Some members of the Company have given us their views and opinions and we and they will welcome those of other members. The columns of "On Deck" are open to all who have something worth while and interesting to tell—and there must be many such in the membership of the N.Z. Company of Master Mariners. We appeal to all to rally in support of this journal. One needs not be a Conrad or a Masefield to tell a plain tale of the sea or to contribute to our columns something of general interest to the profession.

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


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 A. Reed, Master, U.S.S. Co.  
 R. T. Roberts, Wellington.  
 J. U. R. Richmond, Principal Nautical Academy, Auckland.  
 J. Ritchie, Master, U.S.S. Co.  
 H. Ruegg, c/o U.S.S. Co.  
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 W. Whiteford, Nautical Adviser to N.Z. Govt., Marine Department.  
 G. Wilkinson, Eastbourne Ferry Co., Wellington.  
 W. R. Webling, c/o G.S.S. Matai.  
 A. Watchlin, Shipowner, Auckland.

The following new members recently joined the N.Z. Company of Master Mariners through the Auckland Section:—

L. Anderson, U.S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 S. Atkins, Master, Aux. Sch. Huia.  
 S. Angus, U.S.S. Co., Wellington.  
 J. Bell, Master, Mona's Isle, Auckland.  
 W. A. Beswick, Pilot, Auckland, H.B.  
 D. Burgess, Master, W. C. Daldy, Auckland.  
 W. D. Cameron, U.S.S. Co, Wellington  
 R. M. Cliffe, Auckland.  
 A. Davies, Surveyor of Ships, Auckland.  
 J. Forbes, Master, Pilot Launch, Auckland.  
 G. George, Shipowner, Auckland.  
 L. Goddard, Master Stevedore, Auckland.  
 H. Hogan, Pilot, Auckland H.B.  
 A. Jinman, Master Stevedore, Auckland,  
 H. Kasper, Retired Shipowner, Auckland.  
 G. Kelsey, Pilot, Auckland H.B.  
 A. V. Knight, D.S.C., U.S.S. Co., Wellington.  
 L. McDonald, U.S.S. Co., Wellington.  
 D. McKenzie, U.S.S. Co., Wellington.  
 M. Pierotti, Marine Super., N.S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 D. Probert, Master, Te Awhina, Auckland.  
 L. G. Ramsay, U.S.S. Co., Wellington  
 W. Raynes, Northern S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 L. Robertson, Surveyor of Ships, Auckland.  
 F. Shirley, Master, Northern S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 F. Warren, U.S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 W. Webster, Master, M.V. Port Waikato Auckland  
 W. Wright, U.S.S. Co., Auckland.  
 Rev. H. H. Vickery, Chaplain to Seamen, Auckland.





The annual function of the Wellington Section of the N.Z. Company of Master Mariners in Wellington this year took the form of a dinner held at the Hotel St. George on Saturday, 7th August.

Captain S. Holm presided over a gathering of forty-three, including the guests, among whom were His Excellency the Governor-General, Lord Galway (our Patron), the Hon. W. Lee Martin, Minister of Agriculture, Mr. L. B. Campbell, Secretary of the Marine Department, and Captain R. D. Oliver, R.N.

Apologies were received from the Rt. Hon. M. J. Savage, Prime Minister, and Hon. P. Fraser, Minister of Marine; also, from our President, the Hon. Sir Charles Statham, M.L.C., who was out of town.

The toast of "The King" being honoured, the toast of "Our Patron" was proposed by the chairman and responded to by His Excellency, who told us of his visit to a dinner given by the Honourable Company of Master Mariners just prior to his leaving the Old Country.

The toast of "Parliament" was proposed by Captain W. H. Hartman and responded to by Hon. W. Lee Martin. "The Navy" was toasted by Captain Dalglish and Captain R. D. Oliver, R.N., replied.

Dr. E. Kidson proposed the toast of "The Merchant Service," and Captain Coll. McDonald and Captain J. Mawson replied. Captain Knowles toasted the visitors, and Mr. L. B. Campbell and Mr. Leigh Hunt responded.

The toast of "Absent Members" was honoured in bumper glasses after Captain Burgess had mildly scolded them in his droll Scotch manner.

Opportunity was taken during the evening to bid farewell to Captains W. H. Hartman and W. J. Keane, both of whom were leaving Wellington.

Shanties, songs, and stories interspersed the more

serious side of the programme. The musical side of the programme was capably carried out by Captains Boardman, Sawyers, and Peterson.

The annual business meeting was held on August 9. The following members were elected as the Wellington committee: Captains A. D. Holden, S. Holm, W. H. Jessup J. Mawson, and D. R. Paterson. Captain Coll. McDonald was elected vice-president of the Company. Captain McDonald is our senior member and all members will be in accord with the appointment.

Our energetic Secretary, Captain W. J. Keane, was transferred to Auckland by the Marine Department, and his departure left a very hard task of filling the vacancy. However, Captain Knowles is his successor and we feel sure will carry out the duties successfully.

Captain W. H. Hartman, who had been ashore at Wellington as marine superintendent of the Shaw, Savill & Albion Company, has taken command of the Mataroa. Captain Hartman was a member of the Company's executive last year, and we will miss his genial company in the Capital City.

The list of officers of the New Zealand Company of Master Mariners for 1937-1938 is as follows:—Patron, His Excellency the Governor-General, Lord Galway; vice-patron, Captain Coll. McDonald; president, Hon. Sir Charles Statham, M.L.C.; chairman, Captain S. Holm; executive members, Wellington, Captains Jessup, Holden, Holm, Mawson, Patterson; Dunedin, Captain J. McLean; Lyttelton, Captain W. Scott; Auckland, Captain J. W. R. Richmond; Secretary, Captain G. Knowles. Associate members, Col. N. S. Falla, chairman, Union Steam Ship Company Ltd.; Dr. E. Kidson, Director of Meteorological Services, and Mr. S. D. Waters.

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## The Auckland Section

A meeting of the Auckland Section of the New Zealand Company of Master Mariners was held on October 20th. The members present were: Captains H. H. Sargeant, G. E. Fox, A. Davies, A. N. Jenkyns, A. Jinman, W. A. Gray, A. S. Dalglish, F. Warren, D. Probert, M. Holm, H. Falconer, and W. J. Keane. Apologies were received from Captains B. Burk, J. W. R. Richmond, D. McCrone and M. Pierotti.

Captain Fox, who presided in the absence of Captain C. G. Plunkett, said the Auckland Section had been more or less dormant for a long time. In extending a welcome to Captain Keane, who had been transferred from Wellington and taken over the secretarial duties of the Auckland section, he assured him that the support of all Auckland members would be behind his efforts to make the section the comparatively strong one it should be.

Captain Keane said his experience in Wellington had convinced him that in order to give effect to the excellent aims and objects of the Company it must be made as near

100 per cent. representative of all those who held master's certificates as possible.

To the strong nucleus of responsible master mariners in shore employment must be added the full strength of the younger men holding masters' certificates at sea. The seafaring profession suffered more from lack of organisation than any other. There were many problems which could well engage the immediate and serious consideration of the Company.

Captain Keane said he was not alone in holding the opinion that if it were not for the existence of Cook Strait, New Zealand would not have a mercantile marine at all. While in the past it had been the popular opinion that shipowners had only to cast a net into the sea to get it full of banknotes, it was becoming increasingly evident that the coastal sea carriage of goods was becoming slowly but surely eliminated by the unfair competition of land transport. From a defence point of view the existence of a strong coastal mercantile marine with

a personnel having a complete knowledge of the coastline was essential to a sea-girt country like New Zealand.

The following committee were elected for the ensuing

year:—Chairman, Captain G. E. Fox; committee, Captains H. H. Sargeant, F. Warren, M. Holm, A. W. Jenkyns, A. Davies; hon. secretary, Captain W. J. Keane.



## Kakariki-Caradale Collision Judgment

An important judgment of considerable interest to Master Mariners was that given by Mr. Justice Dixon in the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court at Melbourne on July 26, in respect of the claim of the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand against the steamship Caradale in respect of the collision, which resulted in and sinking of the Kakariki in Hobson's Bay on the night of January 29, 1937. At the nautical inquiry the Kakariki was found to blame, but the judgment in the High Court reversed that decision and found that the Caradale solely to blame.

In his written judgment, Mr Justice Dixon said:—The course from the West Channel pile light up to the Gellibrand Light is commonly taken to be N22 degrees E true and the distance 20 miles. The bearing from the Gellibrand Pile Light to the Hovell Light which marks the South Channel is nearly due South true, about S. 2 degrees W. The variation in Port Phillip Bay between true North and magnetic is 8 degrees 10'E. There can be no doubt that the wreck marks within a very short distance indeed the place where the collision occurred, and it is natural to ask how it comes about that ships which ought to have been proceeding on such respective courses met at the point lying S 13 degrees 36'W from the Gellibrand Light. That light lies S.14 W degrees or a little less from the Williamstown Buoy.

On the part of the Caradale, her presence in the vicinity is explained on the ground that in waters approaching the river, which is a narrow channel, it is a well recognised usage for out-going vessels to keep to the starboard or West, and for incoming vessels to keep to the port or east so that the latter may enter the river on their right hand or proper side without interference near the mouth from the former. Her master says that accordingly on rounding the Williamstown Buoy he steadied his vessel on a course of S.½E magnetic which is a little more than S.5° W. true, a course which would have taken him within a cable and a half of the Gellibrand Light, whence he would set his course to the Hovell Light. But according to him, after a few minutes, as he had sighted on rounding the buoy the lights of the Kakariki, then about three miles down the Bay, he took his ship further west and steadied on a course three quarters South of a point over, viz. S.¾W. This course, he says, brought him close to the light and into the area where, owing, as he maintained, to the movements of the Kakariki, the ships came into collision.

On the part of the Kakariki it is said there is no uniformity in the way in which vessels approach the waters at the mouth of the river. The narrow channel admittedly ends in fact at the flashing buoy at Williamstown. They are open waters south of that point and it is said that even if it be true that nearing the mouth of the river vessels commonly keep or are expected to keep to their respective starboard sides, yet this can-

not extend south of the Gellibrand Light which is about 5,575 feet from the Williamstown flashing buoy. To account for the Kakariki being in the neighbourhood of the point where the collision actually took place, it is enough for her master to point to the course which, he claims he was making. Her course of N. 22 degrees E. true, if set from two cables off, that is east of, the West Channel Pile Light and maintained should, it is said have brought her out two cables off Gellibrand.

If the customary rule which is set up on behalf of the Caradale prevailed and applied so far south, it may be that the Kakariki would be expected to go further to the east, but, unless she did so, her course would be expected to bring her within a cable and a half of the point of collision. It is true that according to a calculation made and caused to be made by the plaintiff's counsel, the exact bearing of the Gellibrand Light from the West Channel Pile Light is N. 21 degrees 11' E., and according to another stated by the defendant's counsel a variation of a degree in a course of twenty miles exactly maintained means a difference of four cables or 2,400 feet in a ship's position after accomplishing that distance. Neither of these calculations was proved in evidence although no doubt the second is the result somewhat overstated of an ordinary trigonometrical ratio. It would mean that if the Kakariki accurately laid and kept a course of N. 22 degrees E. true she would have passed some cables further east of the point of collision. Her master says that seeing the outgoing Caradale and in view of her movements he gave a helm order to port at a point which he has estimated would be about 9 cables or a mile from the Gellibrand Light. This order and perhaps a subsequent order hard-a-port, given at a later stage brought his vessel to the point where it was struck. A very general view of the nature of the case suggests that the collision was brought about by an attempt on the part of one vessel, the Caradale to pass red to red combined with an intention, if not an attempt on the part of the other the Kakariki to pass green to green. But this gives no more than a reason why the casualty occurred; it does not explain by what relative movements of the vessels they were brought into collision or in which of them the fault lay.

As to the alleged custom usage or practice, in spite of the widely differing opinions expressed in the witness-box by expert mariners and pilots, I think that the position is reasonably clear. The topographical features of Hobson's Bay make it natural that an incoming vessel will keep more to the east than a direct course even from the Hovell Light renders necessary. She must enter the river on the eastern side. There is a deep dredged channel from the Port Melbourne channel to the entrance of the river. Some ships going up the river may be of such draught that they use it. It leads up to the Williamstown Buoy, on the north-eastern side of which an incoming ship must pass. Outcoming vessels must keep on the other side of the buoy. Many of



them will go down to the Gellibrand Light for the purpose of proceeding to the West Channel; others, those going to the South Channel, find it convenient to set their course to the Hovell Light by reference to the Gellibrand Light and at the same time to keep to the west of incoming ships. As ingoing and outgoing vessels may readily find themselves meeting end-on or nearly end-on and therefore obliged to keep to starboard, it is better to keep over to begin with. As a consequence more often than not outgoing ships are found keeping a little west and incoming ships a little east, with the result that for the most part vessels in those waters pass red to red,

But there is no uniformity, no usage, departure from which is regarded as a clear breach of proper seamanship. The waters up to the Williamstown Buoy are clearly open and the ordinary rules for the prevention of collision at sea apply to them and not Article 25. No one believes that the waters outside the Gellibrand Light are a narrow channel. Apparently some believe that the waters down to the Gellibrand Light constitute a narrow channel. But I do not think that the belief is widespread.

#### THE CARADALE'S MOVEMENTS.

The Caradale left the wharf at Victoria Dock at 10.17 p.m. At 10.50 her engineer was given "full ahead," before she had actually reached the river mouth marked by the red and green lights. She reached the Williamstown Flashing Buoy, probably at 11 or slightly before. She proceeded thence for 6 to 7 minutes at a speed which I estimate at something over 8 knots, but probably not more than 8 and a half knots. The engine-room was then given the "All Clear" signal and she increased her speed by at least a knot, attaining in the next four minutes something approaching 10 knots. On passing Williamstown Flashing Buoy her course was not definitely set in terms of a compass bearing, but she was brought round to and steadied upon a course which, according to the helmsmen was shown by the compass to be S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  E. magnetic. No doubt in coming round before she steadied she would go somewhat east of a north and south line from the buoy. At all events I think she did adopt a course bringing her about two cables or a little more to the east of the Gellibrand Pile Light and if she steadied on that course, well east of the north and south line of the buoy, that would be S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  E. magnetic or perhaps 5 degrees W. true. Notwithstanding the evidence that she held this course for a very short time I think it was maintained until she was nearly abreast of the Gellibrand Light.

During this time the Kakariki was visible on the Caradale's starboard, not her port bow. At an early stage she had displayed her red light to the Caradale but she was drawing abreast of the Gellibrand Pile the Caradale was put to starboard some degrees under a point. The purpose was to pass the Kakariki red to red. I am inclined to think that not only had the latter's green and red lights then been in view, but the red light had been lost. Her bearing was something over a point on the Caradale's starboard bow. The alteration in the Caradale's course was again not made in terms

of a compass bearing and I think that she steadied upon it for a very short time. Probably the compass showed the quartermaster S.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W. The alteration was, not sufficient to put the Kakariki on the Caradale's port bow. But it was in my opinion, not intended as a steady course, and the Kakariki appeared a long distance away and was expected to starboard. In fact she was about a mile and a half away. This starboard movement of the Caradale took place just before 11.6 p.m. at that time the engine-room was given all clear and the speed was brought up.

Notwithstanding the statements to the contrary I think the Caradale made a still greater movement to starboard before the helm was put hard over in the manner I am about to describe. It is not easy to say how far, but I think that the purpose of passing the Kakariki red to red was pursued. No helm signal was given. The Caradale had no look out on the fore-castle head. On the bridge with the helmsman was the master and the third officer who, coming down the river, had been stationed forward. After the all clear signal had been given he went into the chart-room behind the wheel house. He went there in order to look at the course down the bay that had been logged on the previous voyage out. The master said that he had directed him to do so as a young officer for his edification or instructions. The master stood, I think, on the port side of the wheel house. For some reason he did not see what I think probably occurred on the first starboard movement of his own ship, namely, that the Kakariki had gone to port. The helmsman was steering by compass and had not noticed it. The joint speed of the ships was 18 knots or perhaps more, and a short time made a great difference in their positions. When the third officer returned and reported what was logged as the previous course both heard a sound signal from the Kakariki. They looked up and saw that the green light only of the Kakariki was showing and that she had gone to port and not, as was expected, to starboard. In fact the said sound signal was two blasts and if they had been fully attentive and had had no preconceived idea that both ships were about to pass red to red I think they could have had no doubt of its significance. To what degree there was a genuine question whether it was one or two blasts I am unable to say. I am inclined to think that the master was taken by surprise and that whatever question he cried out to the third officer and helmsman amounted to nothing but an ejaculation instinctively placing on the other ship responsibility for some misconduct or fault in the matter.

He put the helm hard a-starboard and by doing so brought the ship to the point of collision. He rang full astern but I think there was enough interval between the giving and the execution of the order for the ship to come round from whatever point her stem was upon, a great many degrees to the west.

For I do not think that the Kakariki's head was at the moment of impact so very far, if at all, west of the point to which it now lies directed and I think that at or after the collision and before the Caradale drew away, her starboard light was visible along a line from point of collision carried through or very close to the



Gellibrand Light. As she struck the Kakariki her fore and aft line was not quite at right angles with that of the latter ship. The greater angle was, I think, that made with the fore part of the Kakariki. That ship had still some although not much, way on, but she may have brought the Caradale's head round to some extent. The visibility of her green light from behind Gellibrand Light does not therefore, necessarily mean that at the moment of impact she had gone round fully to west magnetic.

The reduction of speed in the Caradale in consequence of her engine being put astern is a matter difficult to estimate, but I am inclined to think that she was making 10 knots or thereabouts when they were reversed and that fully a minute did not then elapse before she struck the Kakariki. The impact occurred I believe about 11 minutes past 11.

#### MOVEMENTS OF THE KAKARIKI.

It is now necessary to state the movements and actions of the Kakariki. Her course had been set from abreast of the West Channel Pile Light which probably she passed at about two cables distance. The time was 5 minutes to 9 or thereabouts. The course was set as N. 12 degrees E. by her standard compass. The compass on her lower or ordinary navigation bridge where at that time her helmsman steered her, varied from the standard compass on the upper bridge. I believe that the ship was steadied on the course according to the standard compass. But it is uncertain what on the voyage up Port Phillip Bay was the precise deviation of that compass from N. magnetic. On the whole, I think the proper conclusion is that it was between one and two degrees east. Probably little attention was paid to the exact deviation when 10 degrees E. was set; that being regarded as an ample allowance. In Port Phillip Bay N. 14 degrees E. magnetic is the approximate equivalent of N. 22 degrees E. true. She was steered by the lower bridge compass until about half past 10 when the helmsman and the Master went to the upper bridge which was used in taking the ship through the approaches to port. At some time between that hour and 11 o'clock the helmsman ceased to steer by the compass, the light of which he covered or obscured, and steered by some shore light or lights. The third officer was upon the lower bridge where the telegraph was situated. At ten minutes to 11 he gave the time to the engine-room and said that they would reach Gellibrand in another 20 minutes. The engineer then made her engine ready for manoeuvring. The ship maintained the speed of about 8½ knots. It is likely that while steering by a light or lights the helmsman had brought the ship a little to port, but I think that at 11 o'clock she was not more than about half a point off the course represented by N. 12 degrees E. on her standard compass.

It is not of course possible to fix her position at that time with exactness, but my opinion is that at 11 o'clock she was about two miles between S. 13 degrees W. and 15 degrees W. true from the Gellibrand Light and that she was on a course which was between N. 16 degrees E. and N. 22 degrees E. true. I am inclined to think that it was at this time nearer 16 degrees E. than

22 degrees E. If so, she maintained that course until about six minutes past 11 when she altered her course to port. She did so because she saw the Caradale come to starboard. At the same time she gave two blasts. The point where that was done I fix at between 6 and 7 cables from the place of collision. The ships were separated by double that distance and I do not think that these sound signals were heard upon the Caradale. When the Caradale's next movement to starboard was seen the Kakariki was put hard a port. The Caradale's red light had not then come into view. Two blasts were sounded by the Kakariki and, I believe, distinctly sounded. When this was done full astern was rung and she was at once put full astern, the readiness of the engine allowing it to be done with greater quickness. I think her head went round to port, but how many degrees I am unable to say. The two movements to port brought her fore and aft line at the moment of collision at an angle with the Caradale which I have already described and the actual direction of each ship is interdependent with the other. I have already stated my view of the Caradale's direction. The time which elapsed after the order full astern was executed in the engine-room until the collision is difficult to fix but it was enough to reduce the way of the Kakariki very greatly. I estimate that the reduction was from a speed of 8½ knots to a speed of two knots. Probably the time was a minute and a half. As the Caradale came round her red light came into view, and then her green light shut out. But this was, I believe, after the Kakariki had been put hard-a-port.

#### BEFORE THE COLLISION.

I have regarded the question whether the Kakariki lay upon the port bow of the Caradale while the latter steamed on a course S. ½ E. as of much importance. I am convinced that she did not. Every consideration seems to me to tell against such a relative position of the ships. I believe the evidence that she displayed her green light to the Kakariki. Then the time at which the lights of the Kakariki were picked up by the Caradale was about 11 o'clock. The bearing of the Kakariki could scarcely be less than S ½ E magnetic if she were on the Caradale's port hand. That is less than 3 degrees on her bow. Upon the evidence I think that at about 5 or 6 minutes past 11 the Kakariki was in a position not further east than of a line which can most conveniently be described by adopting the end of the Gellibrand Pier as a reference point and taking therefrom the bearing of S 4deg. W true. She was, I believe, further west, but that line I regard as the eastern limit of her position. It would be impossible for her to move across in the interval and at the same time exhibit to the Caradale any coloured light but her green. The manoeuvre is a most improbable one and all the evidence from the Kakariki is opposed to it. Moreover, when from the William Andrew she was first seen within, that is, west of the line I have stated, her red, not her green light was visible, which means that she must have at that moment been steaming at least five degrees of north true. This would make it necessary for her to have gone round towards the east after having moved



over towards the west. When from the Kakariki some of the lights of the Caradale were seen before she had rounded the Williamstown Flashing Buoy and steadied on her course S  $\frac{1}{2}$  E magnetic, I think that the bearing of the lights was not particularly noticed, but that the general impression remaining in the minds of those navigating the Kakariki was that they were ahead. As a result probably of studying charts and going over the facts of the case, they have formed the belief that although, roughly speaking, these lights were ahead, they were slightly on the port side of the Kakariki's fore and aft line.

The Caradale, before she rounded the buoy, was necessarily moving across the natural line of vision. I think it improbable that any impression of where she precisely was when in relation to the fore and aft line of the Kakariki when first sighted was made upon the minds of the witnesses with sufficient distinctness to make their statements on the question of a reliable guide. At the same time I do not under-estimate the importance of the bearings of, say, the flashing buoy, and of the Gellibrand Light from the course of the Kakariki at the time when the Caradale came round the buoy. For, if the relation of those points to the fore and aft line of the Kakariki could be established, it would fix within limits the position of the Kakariki. But the two bearings on any view could not be very far apart, that is, could not include a large angle and it would, therefore, be necessary to obtain them with a good deal of precision. I do not think that before the collision the position of these points at a given stage, particularly the position of the flashing buoy, assumed enough importance to leave an impression upon which any dependence could be placed. I think the Gellibrand Light was probably somewhere about half to three-quarters of a point on the Kakariki's port hand and the flashing buoy somewhat finer. As she came up the Bay the Gellibrand Light, which was picked up ahead and at that distance was apparently almost right ahead had been, I believe, gradually assuming a position on the port bow. When the helmsman began to steer by shore lights it may well be as I have said, that he brought the ship's head over somewhat to the west of the original course. That reason, coupled with the evidence of those navigating the Kakariki as to the Williamstown Lights being ahead, has led me to think that possibly the course at the moment may have been as far over the compass from 22 degrees E true as 16 degrees E. Of course, whether the Caradale saw both her lights that is on the former's starboard bow before going to starboard depends to some extent on the same question and on the same doubt.

I am not prepared to act upon the evidence given by those navigating the Caradale as to her actual movements and the time and distance between them and the relation of the other vessel. I think that they were off their guard at the critical time and fell into excitement and confusion. In reconstructing the events leading up to the casualty, they found the justification of the part played by the Caradale in the belief which they were under that the ships would pass red to red and doubtless this meant assigning the bearing of the Kakariki

to the Caradale's port bow. But it does not follow that every part of the account given of the Caradale's navigation should be rejected and as will be seen from my statement above, I have treated much as representing actual occurrences, but the picture as having some distortion.

In stating that at about 11 o'clock the Kakariki was in a position between S 13 degrees and 15 degrees W from the Gellibrand Light and then giving the course only within a limit of 6 degrees I have fixed the margins which, if the extremes are combined, will produce a considerable difference in the position which they leave open to the Kakariki six minutes later. There is, I think, a difference east and west of at least a cable and a half between the position which she would have reached steaming N 16 degrees E and  $8\frac{1}{2}$  knots from two miles S. 15 degrees W of Gellibrand and that steaming N 22 degrees E from two miles S 13 degrees W. But I do not think the first of these extreme combinations, or anything closely approaching it, occurred. The Kakariki was not, in my opinion, so far west after 11.5 p.m. as it would mean. Again, although I am unable definitely to say that the Kakariki was at 11 o'clock off a course of 22 degrees E I believe that before the Caradale starboarded near the Gellibrand Light she was slightly on the Kakariki's starboard bow. This means that if the Kakariki was on the course of 22 degrees E at 11 o'clock she must have swung off it before that movement of the Caradale. The witnesses from the navigation bridge of the Kakariki put the Caradale on the ship's starboard hand much earlier. But I think they must be mistaken in doing so. If the Caradale had held the green light alone of the Kakariki for some considerable length of time, I cannot think that the Caradale would have starboarded. The explanation is, I believe, that the Kakariki had the green light of the Caradale on her starboard bow when she ported and that with this impression prominently in mind, the length of time it was there is overestimated.

On the other hand, I am inclined to think the starboarding of the Caradale was based on the notion that she held the two side lights of the Kakariki, the loss of the red not having been observed. That it should not be observed may be thought improbable. But without some failure in appreciation on one ship or other of the movements of the second, or of the changes in the relation between them, the collision could not have taken place. It must not be forgotten that the master was at the most important time the only person undertaking the duty of a look out.

In dealing with the times, speeds and positions of the Caradale I have compared the evidence of those aboard that ship not only with the evidence of those aboard the Kakariki, but also with the observations of James and Ricketts and with the deductions which may be made from the times they give, the distance traversed by the William Andrew between different points and her speed and movements. In putting the first starboarding of the Caradale just before 11.6 p.m. I am guided by an inference based upon a number of matters. There is, first, what was seen from the William Andrew and the time at which, or after which, it must



have been seen. In particular, I attach importance to Ricketts' statement that "at a stage in the proximity of the breast line of the Gellibrand Light she moved slightly to the westward." But considering the distance from the place of collision, I think his estimate of two to two and a half minutes as the time she held that course, excessive.

In the second place, there are the descriptions given by the witnesses from the Kakariki, and in the third place it seems to be probable that the explanation of the distance at which I am satisfied that the Caradale passed the Gellibrand Light as well as the evidence given by those on her bridge is that the course of S  $\frac{1}{2}$  E was kept much longer than they state and continued until they were drawing abreast of the light. Although I have expressed the view that the Caradale made a still greater movement to starboard before the final order of hard-a-starboard, I do not regard it as of any great importance whether she did so or not. I think, however, that the more probable explanation of the attempt to avoid a collision by putting the helm over to starboard is that her stem was already further over than is admitted, and this fits in better with the other descriptions of the final stages of the collision and her position at the time of impact. But I do not think that she had shut out her green light from the view of the Kakariki. In fact, I think that the mistake was made by the master of the Caradale in putting the helm hard a starboard. He saw that the other ship had gone to port and if he, too, had ported, a collision would not have occurred. His ship had much more time to answer the movement of the helm before the engines were full astern than in the case of the Kakariki and her way was greatly maintained.

#### CARADALE AT FAULT.

From the facts as I have found them, it follows that the Caradale was at fault. She had the Kakariki on her starboard hand for some time. The courses upon which the two ships were, did, no doubt, intersect, but before the Caradale changed her course it was in fact certain that the Kakariki would not reach the point of intersection until the Caradale had passed that point, and I do not think that at the time of the Caradale's movement to starboard there was danger of collision. It was her starboarding that created the risk and her further starboarding led to the actual collision. It was then that the collision rules began to apply. The Kakariki was still on her starboard; she was, therefore, in a position of a give way ship. If she regained or held both the Kakariki's lights the crossing rule applied and the Caradale took the wrong course. If the ships were green to green, it was improper to starboard to the green light. The final order hard a starboard turned out to be wrong. As something done in the crisis of a collision that it turned out to be wrong would not mean fault or negligence. But I think it arose out of some failure in vigilance occurring on the navigation bridge and out of the confusion and excitement due to a sudden realisation of the danger thus created.

It is not possible to say whether, if a look out had been posted on the fore-castle head, he would have given

a warning in time or at all. But, in the absence of a look-out there, it cannot, I think, be right for the same man to undertake the navigation of a ship and, at any rate in those waters the duties of a look-out on the bridge. While the third officer was in the chart-house, the master occupied that position and the realisation of the state of danger into which they had got did not, in my opinion, occur until on the third officer's return the Kakariki's blasts called their attention to it.

On the part of the Kakariki there was, of course, no fault in porting when she did so with the Caradale on her starboard bow, however slightly over the Caradale may have been. I think that the Caradale's movement to starboard did not result in placing upon the Kakariki either the obligation of Article 21 or of Article 18. It is, I think, true that for a short space the Caradale again got the Kakariki's two lights. But it appears to me to be improbable that she held them. The Kakariki was herself porting and it is unlikely that the ships ever came end on, and they were certainly not "meeting end on or nearly end on." I think too, that when the Kakariki next ported she was again showing her green light alone to the Caradale.

I find that the Caradale was solely to blame and that the collision was due to her negligence. I, therefore, pronounce the collision in question in this suit to have been occasioned by the fault of the owners, master and crew of the steam ship Caradale or some or one of them and I pronounce for the plaintiff's claim for damages and against the counter-claim and condemn the defendant in damages and in costs.

(It was announced on October 22 that an appeal against the above judgment had been withdrawn by the owners of the Caradale.)

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## TRAINING OF BOYS FOR THE SEA

To the Editor. Sir,—Will you please advise me through your columns what our executive is doing regarding a training ship for New Zealand boys. All of us know that thousands of boys in this country wish to follow the sea as a profession and there are very few opportunities for them to start. There was a move made some years ago to start a training ship. Has the movement died down? I consider that the Government should be approached to acquire an auxiliary barque and fit her up to carry boys.


Training in sail is recognised by all foreign countries to be the best training for future officers and seamen and New Zealand being wholly dependent on sea transport for its prosperity should do its part in giving its boys the best training obtainable.

Will you also advise me if membership of the New Zealand Company of Master Mariners is limited or is it open to any persons holding a master's certificate, and if so is a home trade certificate sufficient to gain membership?

Yours faithfully,  
"TOM PEPPER."



world," she asked when making the inevitable broadcast, "would it be possible for a woman to become, as I have done, a captain of distant sailing?" On the other hand, even Soviet denizens of the lower deck might blench at the intimation that the "Old Woman" was aboard.



## A Veteran Master Mariner

Captain Coll McDonald, who is widely known and universally respected, tells the story of his life in the following article. He is one of the most senior members of the New Zealand Company of Master Mariners and is its vice-patron.

I was born on 9th September, 1863, at a place called Torrane, situated on the south-west side of Loch Screedon on the Island of Hull, Argyleshire, Scotland.

My mother descended from the MacLeans of Duart, and my father from the McDonalds of Staffs. They were at the time what was called crofters, and in consequence were poor as far as wealth in cash was concerned. My mother died when I was four years of age, and my father never married again. There were five children—three of them older than myself and one two years younger. All of us had to start the hard battle of life as soon as we were able to do so. As there was no free education at the time we had little or no schooling, except that our father used to teach us in Gaelic and generally from a Gaelic Bible. Apart from this, I myself was never inside a schoolhouse.

I started my own career by leaving my father's home at the age of nine years. I engaged for one year to a farmer whose farm was situated twenty miles from my father's home. The name of my employer was Hugh MacPhail. He afterwards sold out and came to New Zealand, and as far as I know died at Waipahi. My wages were £1 per year and my food, such as it was in those days. After completing my year of service at what they called a herd boy, I left the MacPhails and engaged myself for herding cows to another farmer of the name of MacArthur at a place called Loch Doon, twenty-five miles from my father's home. My wages were £1 per year and my food. On completing my one year of service with MacArthur, I decided, being now eleven years of age, to emigrate across the Sound of Mull to the small town on the mainland called Oban. The yearly fair was on at the time, and a farmer by the name of Culloch engaged me as herd boy for one year. His farm was on a small island two miles from Oban called Kerrara. My wage in this case was £1 10s per year and food. After completing my year of service with MacCulloch, I left and went into the town of Oban, being now twelve years of age. I considered myself a sort of a man, and in consequence made up my mind to give up herding cows. I therefore took service with an engineer in Oban, by name Carmichael, as a handy boy in his workshop. My wages were 5/- per week, finding my own food and lodging. After serving in this shop for six months I left and went back to the Island of

Mull again, and took service with a country engineer as an apprentice at a place called Lochdoon Head; in this case my wage was 5/- per week, also food and lodging.

After serving as an understudy with the Lochdoon Engineer for eighteen months I came to the conclusion that I could not learn all that I wanted, and being now fourteen years of age, I left for the large city of Glasgow. Knowing the address of an outside relation of my father, I appealed to him to get me work, and he got me a position as an apprentice with an engineering firm called Clark and Co. My wages with this firm were 5/- per week first year and 7/6 second year, finding my own food and lodging. I put in twelve hours a day, out of which I had two hours for meals, but no half-day on Saturday—6 a.m. to 6 p.m. for six days per week, besides which I had to walk two miles to and from my work, summer and winter. After serving for eighteen months and having neither friends nor money to back me, I decided to give up the engineering business and to go to sea for a trial spin.

I was now about sixteen years of age, and although long and lanky I was strong and healthy. Through the good offices of another Highland lad I got a position as ordinary seaman in a ship called the Princess Alexander which traded all round the ports of Europe. I served for six months in this vessel, leaving her to join a new ship called the Burnley belonging to the Direct Line trading to all West Indies ports, including ports on the coast of British Honduras. I got the position of able seaman in this ship. The name of the master was Whyborn, and it suited him well, for he was a hard and cruel master. While at Balizo in British Honduras I took yellow fever and had a bad time.

Returning to London I left the Direct Line and joined the Anchor Line, signing on in a large ship called the Olympia trading to the Mediterranean and Eastern ports of the United States of America. After making a round voyage I was transferred to the Alexandria, also of the Anchor Line and trading to the East Indies and the Mediterranean. This vessel was under the command of Captain Hansey, who afterwards made a good name for himself in the North Atlantic trade.

After serving in the Anchor Line of Glasgow for two years, and being now nineteen years of age I left and shipped in the immigrant ship Jesse Readman belonging to the well-known firm of Patrick Henderson & Co. of Glasgow. We left the Clyde in August, 1882, with 286 passengers, all of whom were landed at Port Chalmers. Before the Jessie Readman sailed for Home I got Captain Gibson to pay me off.

After a month of knocking about Dunedin I shipped as a sort of second mate and boatswain in a brig called the Wave under Captain Christian. This craft was bound to Kaipara for kauri logs. We had as passengers a farmer from Scotland with his wife, daughter and two sons. It took us four hours to get outside the Heads and four weeks to get to Kaipara where we moored in what was called MacLeod's Creek, landed the passengers and commenced loading. It took about three weeks



to load. While trying to sail out over the bar we got out of the channel, striking on the spit. The old ship split fore and aft along the keel. After rolling about in the breakers for some time we drifted back into the harbour and on to a safe beach, where the vessel was condemned. All hands left for Auckland with the exception of a very ugly Russian whom we had among the crew. He went down to the home of the farmer that we had as passengers. After he was working there for some time he married the farmer's only daughter, who was as pretty as he was ugly.

On reaching Auckland we found that conditions were very bad. I could not get a ship, so I took up navy work knocking down a hill to make a foundation for freezing works at the head of the present Railway pier. At this work I had 5/- per day and had to buy my pick and shovel both costing me five shillings or a day's work, and anyone showing signs of loafing was paid off at once.

After putting in a few months at the navy work I got a position in one of Mr. MacGregor's vessels now called the Northern Steamship Company. This craft was a wooden steamer trading around the Gulf. Two months later I transferred as second mate to another small steamer, trading on the West Coast between Onehunga and Waitara. Our cargo was chiefly cattle. At Waitara we used to go out on the bar at low tide and clear a channel with shovels so that we could get out loaded at high tide. A few weeks later I was transferred to a new craft called the Gareloch.

After a year's service with MacGregor I left and shipped to England in the Hurunui belonging to the New Zealand Shipping Company with Captain Sinclair in charge. After two months at Home I shipped in the Janet Court to Australia, leaving her at Adelaide. I went to Melbourne by rail and took passage to Dunedin in the old Tarawera (Captain Sinclair). On arrival at Dunedin, I was fortunate enough to get into the service of Union Steamship Company at the beginning of 1885. I joined the old Waihora as quarter-master under Captain MacGee. Three years later I was appointed fourth officer of the Wairarapa under Captain Chatfield.

Having served in the various grades from Fourth

Officer to Chief Officer in ten of the Company's best ships, I was appointed master in 1897, twelve years from the date of joining. At various times I was in command of the following steamers belonging to the Union Company:—Poherua, Corinna, Kini, Te Anau, Moana, Talune, Mararoa, Whangape, Monowai, Manuka, Upolo, Moura, Waikare, Wakatipu, Wanaka, Waihora, Ovalau, Warrimoo, Penguin, Tarawera, Aparima, Navua, Flora, and Moeraki. I never had an accident of any kind with any ship placed under my care.

In 1907 I was appointed assistant marine superintendent for the company at head office, Dunedin. I remained in this position until 1910, when I was sent to the British Isles to look after the building of new ships. These vessels were the Maunanui, Niagara, Wahine, Katoa, Kama, Karamu, and Aotea-Roa. The last-named vessel was afterwards taken over by the Navy and was sunk in the North Sea by enemy action.

Returning to Dunedin at the beginning of 1914, I was appointed chief marine superintendent for the company. This position I held until I retired in 1924 due to ill-health which was brought on by the amount of work I had to do during the war in connection with troopships and . . . hospital ships reconditioning them after the war was over.

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Even were it not otherwise apparent that the shipping industry is experiencing better weather we would have suspected this to be so on reading in one of the Fleet Street dailies that a tramp steamer recently in the news was "loaded up to her hawseholes."

Engines of the Atlantic liner Eastern Prince hissed to a halt, and a young doctor, waiting till the ship reached the pause on her roll, plunged a needle into the spine of a little English girl and drained away the poison that was killing her. She had encephalitic (inflammation of the brain).

A melodrama episode of the sea, without a doubt, and we do like that touch where the engines "hissed" as they came to a halt.

