New Zealand Company of Master Mariners

From Lloyds List Thursday 4 February 2010 by Sam Ignarski

AMONG the rules of thumb you are taught in the early months of marine insurance training used to be that the pilots of ships had, under the laws of pilotage, essentially no liability for negligence.

The ship and the master had to answer for faults or negligence in the event of loss or damage, for his role was nothing more than that of an advisor to the bridge, even if the services were compulsory.

Pilots, ex-seafarers themselves, often of great vintage, were not necessarily held in the greatest of esteem.

Take this reference to the pilot in Conrad’s impressive short story Youth: “We worked out of the Thames under canvas, with a North Sea pilot on board. His name was Jermyn, and he dodged all day long about the galley drying his handkerchief before the stove. Apparently he never slept. He was a dismal man, with a perpetual tear sparkling at the end of his nose, who either had been in trouble or was in trouble, or expected to be in trouble — could not be happy unless something went wrong.

“He mistrusted my youth, my common-sense and my seamanship, and made a point of showing it in 100 little ways. I dare say he was right. It seems to me I knew very little then and I know not much more now, but I cherish a hate for that Jermyn to this day.”

And so the tyro marine insurance man would witness the steady trickle of groundings and casualties of ships under pilotage, where the blunders and their consequences were paid for by claims submitted by the ship to the underwriters.

Pilots and their associations therefore have tended over the years not to carry errors and omissions insurance, and few, if any, have had cause to rue the day that their frugality has caused. Trouble has come instead from the modern tendency to apply criminal sanctions against pilots.

The latest manifestation of this tendency comes from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Readers may recall how on March 22, 2008, the offshore supply ship Neftegaz-67 collided with the panamax bulk carrier Yang Hai near Hong Kong, resulting in the death of 18 Ukrainian crew members on the supply ship following its capsizing.

This was the worst maritime accident locally since the capsize of the Macau ferry Fat Shan , which capsized during Typhoon Rose in August 1971.

The two masters and two pilots involved have all been jailed following a 90-day trial in a Hong Kong district court before Judge Susan D’Almada Remedios.

Yuriy Kulemesin, the Ukrainian master of the supply ship, received a sentence of three years and two months for breaking collision regulation rules five, eight and nine — failure to keep a proper lookout, failure to avoid a collision and failure to navigate properly in a narrow channel.

Tang Dock-wah, the senior pilot on board the bulk carrier was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Yao Hai master Lin Bo and the ship’s junior pilot, Bruce Chun, were both sent down for 30 months, all three for breaking collision regulations five and eight.

By all accounts this was a horrible casualty, duly marked by the judge who imposed a deterrent sentence for serious errors of navigation to mark the loss of 18 lives. It is not surprising that the court gallery was packed with the families of the pilots, for the previous imperviousness of pilots to paying the legal consequences of professional negligence has gone the way of the seafarers in Hong Kong also.

Word in the small world of marine should go out that, as in San Francisco, so also in Hong Kong and, we can imagine, any mature maritime jurisdiction centre in today’s environment, the untouchable status of pilots is no more.

What should today’s pilots — and indeed seafarers in general — do to cover themselves against the day when they are involved in a serious lapse of judgement or skill. Professional negligence insurance does not often encompass the paying of legal fees for defendants in criminal courts.

P&I insurance has visibly struggled with the legal costs and expenses that arise whenever a master or deck officer is in the dock under a criminal indictment. Yet it must be said that the hazard of criminalisation is a very real part of the spectrum of risks facing pilots and seafarers.

For these individuals, the trauma of an operational failure, which in the modern world is often painfully visible and career-threatening in any event, is followed by arrest and submission to the mercies of the criminal law system of the country concerned.

Some have a very rough time of it indeed, stranded far from home, broke and stuck in jail, with or without the help of consular assistance or the full attention of the owners and clubs concerned.

Errors of judgement or even blunders pepper the lives of many if not all of us. By definition, these acts or omissions lack mens rea, that is to say a guilty mind which formed an intention to do the thing complained of. The traditional plea of anyone in the aftermath of such errors or blunders is invariably: “I did not mean to”. It is usually in retrospect that the charge of careless or reckless conduct is made, which is a kind of trade description of the error in the first place.

Is it really beyond the ken of marine insurance to lay on within the spectrum of covers some kind of contingency for fees for the criminalised seafarer? Legal costs insurers do it all the time, which was of some help to the pilot on board the Cosco Busan , though it did not help the unfortunate man’s progress to jail.

Of one thing we can be sure. The modern need for an individual culprit in many societies is not going to go away very soon and the criminal law can be a rather wayward and blunt instrument in itself.

So certain is the progress of the criminalisation of seafarers in our times that a perfectly good case can be made for it as a marine peril.

Many former pupils  will mourn the loss of the former Director of both the Wellington and Auckland Navigation Schools. 

Captain Mac joined Shaw Savill in 1936 where he remined until 1952, the latter years spent on the MANZ vessel “Ottawa Valley”.

He obtained his Extra Master’s Certificate and joined the NZ Marine Department as examiner of Masters and Mates in 1954. 

Later he was appointed Director of the Wellington School where he remained until transferring to the Auckland School in 1970.  

He retired about 1980 and then obtained his Amatuer Radio Operators Certificate and was in regular contact using morse with many “ham” operators around the world.

Fact and Fiction - Salvage contract misunderstood but still remains essential, writes Todd Busch President of the International Salvage Union

Lloyds List -Thursday 10 December 2009

LLOYD’S Open Form remains the most commonly used form of salvage contract. It has served the shipping community for over 100 years and has been regularly revised to ensure it meets the needs of its users.

But as I go about my business — meeting shipowners, members of the insurance community and lawyers — it is not uncommon to hear concerns about LOF and sometimes revealing misconceptions about one or more of its features. There seems to be a division between regular users of LOF, who clearly understand it well, and the rest.

The International Salvage Union is quite prepared to accept its share of responsibility that such misunderstandings have taken root — but I am committed to making the effort to explain LOF’s features and benefits.

Of course I have an interest to declare, as one of the key objectives of the International Salvage Union is to ensure that Lloyd’s Open Form remains relevant and popular.

That is because, from the salvors’ point of view, it can facilitate swift intervention in a developing casualty situation. And the long experience of our members shows that delaying the involvement of professional salvors, particularly at the onset, can seriously limit the intervention options and can sometimes make what should have been a relatively simple solution more complex, more risky and often more costly.

Commentators sometimes say that modern communications have eroded the need for the Lloyd’s Open Form. They argue that the ease with which the master can take advice from shore-based colleagues means that other forms of contract or commercial negotiation should be used.

There is a grave risk in the master being subservient to shore-based authorities. Only the master at the scene can properly judge the condition of his vessel, the weather, sea state and all other factors, in order to make the decision as to whether salvage assistance urgently needs to be engaged.

LOF is a simple contract form with no up-front “haggling” which again facilitates that quick intervention if the circumstances mean that is the right thing to do.

Another misunderstanding is that the master of the casualty gives up command of the vessel when LOF is agreed. That is not true. The salvage master assumes responsibility for the salvage operation but the master remains in command of his vessel – unless it is completely abandoned and then boarded by the salvors. It is also sometimes thought that in that situation the salvor can claim ownership of the casualty vessel – again that is not true. Even when a vessel has been abandoned, the ownership remains with the shipowners and the cargo interests.

Lloyd’s Open Form is not an open cheque for the salvor. True, fees are not agreed “upfront” but most LOF cases are settled agreeably between the salvor and the shipowner, cargo interests and their insurers once the job is done. If agreement cannot be reached by negotiation, then the case is referred to arbitration through the Lloyd’s Salvage Arbitration Branch. If either party does not agree with the arbitrator’s decision, there is an appeal procedure.

Recourse to litigation under English law at the High Court is rare, and can only arise on a point of law. It means that disputes are not unnecessarily costly and analysis of the salvage awards made show a remarkable consistency over the past decade.

This article can only hint at the importance of LOF and some of the myths surrounding it, but it is certainly in the long term interests of the wider marine community that there should be a readily available, worldwide professional salvage capability.

LOF helps to ensure that provision by offering quality, integrity, experience, transparency and fairness to all parties involved in a casualty — and that encourages salvors to make the necessary investment. And I encourage readers to explore the benefits of this unique and durable salvage contract. Todd Busch is president of the International Salvage Union

Photos from the recent evening held at the Bay Plaza Hotel.

Auckand Branch Award to Captain Compson

It was our Warden, Captain John Frankland’s pleasure to present the Crusoe Award to Captain Bill Compson at the Auckland Branch Annual Summers Night Dinner on Friday evening 4 December 2009. This was in recognition of Bill’s excellent service as Branch Secretary for the last 12 years.

An Auckland Branch Award, the Crusoe Award was donated by Captain Jens Martin in 1995. Jens called it the Crusoe Award because we know the fable character was not the best of sailors. He got lost and wrecked his ship, and the result, of course, was footprints in the sand.

Hence the shape of the award, a bronze foot and footprint mounted on a rimu base. By placing the foot above a sand print we come to the more serious aspect that it signifies that the recipient has made and left an impression.

Conditions are:

• The Crusoe Award does not leave the Auckland region, and ownership remains with the Auckland Branch Committee.
• It can be awarded to any member who over the years has made a significant contribution to the Branch.
• The award can go to a non-member in recognition of an extra special contribution or act aiding the Branch or any of its members, or has made a significant contribution to the Maritime industry. However, in this case it is stressed that the act should be exceptional, not just an act of good seamanship for which we have been trained and is expected of us in the normal course of our duties.

Captain Compson was Secretary of the Auckland Branch from May 1997 until the Branch meeting on 20 August 2009 when he stepped down on his appointment to General Secretary of the New Zealand Company.

M B Deane.

Captains Peter Rae and Geoff Swallow with Commander Dilip Donde

Solo yachtsman Commander Dilip Donde of the Royal Indian Navy is currently in Port at Lyttelton making preparations for the next leg of the Indian Navy challenge which started this year.

Whilst assisting with the preparations, Capt. Peter Rae noticed on his forward bulkhead below that among other plaques one from The Australian Master Mariners. And suggested that it might be appropriate for the New Zealand Company of Master Mariners to present a plaque too.

The attached photo was taken at the presentation of the MM plaque to Commander Dilip Donde on board “Mhadei”  on Monday morning 7^th December 2009.

The vessel is the first of it’s kind ever built in India and is an Indian Navy project, with Commander Dilip the first Indian to sail solo around the world.

Peter Rea has been acting as agent and general advisor to Dilip during the stay in Lyttelton.

The yacht is extremly well constructed and has received much praise from local boatbuilders.

The yacht is due to leave Lyttelton on Saturday 12th, heading around the horn to Falkland Islands and Capetown

Monday 2 November 2009 Lloyds List 

Crew competence still a cause for concern

“It is all very well to criticise regulations and the regulators, but so often the real blame for crew incompetence must surely lie with whoever employed the crew”

YEARS ago, and long before the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code had banished the casual caller from port premises, two of us were sitting on a pile of railway sleepers in an East Anglian port watching a small chemical tanker arrive. It was a smart, apparently well-kept little ship, with a pilot aboard. It approached the quay with every sign that the berthing would be undertaken speedily and without incident. Then began what can only be described as a comedy routine, as at both ends of the vessel, the crew gave a truly memorable performance of mind-blowing incompetence.

The pilot had made his approach perfectly, but the seafarers forward and aft seemed quite incapable of getting lines ashore. Forward, they seemed unable to fasten on a heaving line, despite helpful advice from the linesman on the quay and a torrent of invective from the master on the bridge. The officers in charge of this command performance seemed to be totally incapable of issuing any orders and stood with expressions of despair on their faces, occasionally waving their arms. Heaving lines fell into the water, the ship fell off the quay, the crew milled about on the forecastle and poop, tripping over ropes and over their own big feet. They seemed terrified of putting any weight on the lines and the ship moved up and down the quay as first one end, then the other appeared dominant. Eventually, we saw the pilot on the foredeck helping to turn up the backspring. It was clearly the only way he was going to get home. There was another bout of drama as the gangway was dropped on the quay with a crash. It was clear that whoever had signed on the crew of this chemical carrier had not bothered to ascertain that the seafarers were able. “Perhaps they were chemists,” said my companion as the performance ended.

Pilots, as the chap who had brought in this vessel would clearly have agreed, are good judges of crew competence. From the moment they climb the ladder, after first giving it a huge tug to make sure somebody has bothered to lash it on, until the moment they step ashore in the case of an inbound ship, they watch the crew in one of its busiest phases. While they will get to know regular callers, they have to take the competence of strangers on trust.

Port state control inspectors are called upon to ascertain the competence of the crew, which they do by perhaps asking them some sample questions, and if they really want to test them, asking them to lower a boat into the water, or start the emergency fire pump. But if they really wanted to ascertain the safety of that ship, (because this is all about safety and not mere bureaucracy) they would board with the pilot and observe the performance as the crew is effectively put to the test.

There is a worrying article in the latest issue of the Nautical Institute Seaways magazine from a senior pilot in the New South Wales port of Newcastle, a port which has seen more than its fair share of events, from great armadas of bulkers anchored offshore to the spectacular grounding of the Pasha Bulker, which dragged an anchor in a gale and blew ashore. Malcolm Goodfellow works in an exceptionally busy port in which a high proportion of the traffic is large dry bulk carriers entering light and departing fully laden. Margins for error are very small, and potential for a fairly frightful disaster substantial. Not that Newcastle is anything unique in this respect. In his article, Capt Goodfellow complains that in many cases, crew competence is often inadequate for the job in hand, and while the presence of the pilot is supposed to supplement the bridge team, “in many instances, the pilot’s presence on the bridge reduces the effective bridge team to one: the pilot himself”.

This is not just opinion from a pilot who might have an axe to grind. His arguments are backed up by two separate surveys by Newcastle Port Corp pilots, one relating to crew competence and the other relating to anchoring practice and general precautions in the roadstead off the port.

Some of the findings from the first report were alarming in the extreme. These ranged from the 15% of bridge teams which were unable to operate their own equipment properly, 68% not monitoring the helm during pilotage, 15% having difficulty mooring the vessel (those chemists may have emigrated?) and 11% have English language difficulties. While only 8% of helmsmen have trouble steering, just one hamfisted and confused person at the wheel can make the most almighty mess with a 50 m beam ship in a channel that is 180 m wide. Put into perspective, 8% of the helmsmen being off-colour means that more than 260 of these chaps per annum could cause difficulties to the pilots. The same percentage could not handle tugs correctly. In 85% of cases, there was no attempt to tell the pilot about the ship’s characteristics, which seems rather remiss. There was, worryingly, a lot more along these lines.

There is absolutely no suggestion that Newcastle is unique in attracting large numbers of ships crewed by incompetents, and the experience will undoubtedly mirror the concern felt in ports all over the world. Indeed, the scrutiny of ships entering this important Australian export terminal might be considered quite close, with the main exporters now focusing increasingly on ship quality in the chartered tonnage that is taken on. There are also certain local sensitivities that go back to the ‘Ships of Shame’ inquiry, when there was some evidence that dry bulkers (at a time when many of the operators were barely breaking even) were not the best-run vessels arriving on the Australian coast.

But that was then and this is now. Capt Goodfellow suggests that the findings in Newcastle ought to encourage the same sort of inquiry in other ports throughout the world, to provide a more universal assessment of competence.

THE Newcastle pilots are not unusual in what they expect when they board a ship, where they hope for a competent bridge team, a helmsman who can actually steer with some precision and understand their helm orders. They want the deck crew to be able to take the tug lines promptly and safely, as the ship enters a narrow channel at some considerable speed. They want the ship to be made fast as it reaches the berth. None of it, as they say, is rocket science, or an unreasonable expectation. It seems sad that they are disappointed so often.

Almost on cue, the same week that Seaways appeared, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau was publishing a report on an incident in Port Hedland waters, where a departing fully laden capesize went aground after suffering a steering gear failure within minutes of letting go all its tugs. Iron King was suffering one of these maddening intermittent steering gear faults, and the investigators were critical of the inability of the ship team to put in hand their emergency procedures fast enough. It was clearly one of those incidents that pilots and shipmasters have nightmares about. It was not so much a competency issue, however.

But the message is coming in about the quality of ship’s crews from around the world. The ‘simple’ matter of an ability to steer a ship has been causing concern to pilots from the Suez Canal to Yokohama, and competency complaints are a regular feature in P&I Club publications and accident investigators’ reports.

Capt Goodfellow suggests that contributing factors include varying training standards under STCW 78/95, inefficient implementation by flag states, vessel crewing levels, operational pressures on masters and crews and modern vessel complexities. He adds “and the rest”. It is true that a ship lying securely alongside is the wrong venue for an adequate port state inspection, when, if the paperwork is adequate and the appearance of the ship passable, the inspectors may not dig any deeper.

As I so often complain, it is all very well to criticise regulations and the regulators, but so often the real blame for crew incompetence must surely lie with whoever employed the crew. Everyone blames everyone else about such matters, but surely an owner who signs on incompetents is as culpable as anyone else. The owner might hold up his hands and blame the crew manager, or point out that all the crew paperwork was perfect, but it is still his responsibility to ensure that people who take his ship to sea are capable of doing the job, and have been properly trained.

If the helmsman who speaks no known language answers a five degrees port helm order by hurling the wheel hard over to starboard, with the ship running into Newcastle at 10 knots and the tugs not yet connected, with the master’s mind in neutral and the OOW making himself a cup of tea, the owner ought to bear some of the responsibility for the carnage. Is that so very unreasonable?

My goal is to sail solo around the world non-stop, unassisted. I have chosen a route that is a traditionally recognised path and distance for ‘around the world sailors’. As this is a Southern Hemisphere voyage the significant landmarks are the southern tips of the American and African continents, as well as some of the most challenging oceans a sailor will ever face. The entire journey is a mix of amazing experience and unique challenges.

There are a few key targets I must achieve to qualify for around the world status. The approximate distance is 23,000 nautical miles (about 38,000 kilometres). I must depart and arrive from the same port, cross all lines of longitude, cross the equator entering into the Northern Hemisphere at least once and round the southern landmarks of South America and South Africa.

I have described the journey in parts to give you an idea of my path over the coming months. You will be able to track me and Ella’s Pink Lady on this website and through my media partner ONE (Network Ten’s 24/7 sports channel).

Part 1 – Departing Sydney and North to the Line Island

The general track will be out of the Sydney Heads and towards northern New Zealand. Depending on the weather (direction and strength of the wind) I will choose a point where I turn left and head towards Fiji. At this stage it’s hard to tell if I will go to the left or right of the Fijian Islands.

Once past Fiji and Samoa my course is northeast to the Line Islands. The Equator lays just South of Christmas Island, which is the capital of Kiribati. I will round one of the islands in the Line Group that is north of the equator.

Part 2 – South to Chile and Cape Horn

With the Line Islands behind me it’s due south for a while. To make South America I need to head a long way down before I can turn east. This area is well known as the roaring forties. Despite not being there for long I will probably be south of the 50^th parallel to make the passage between Argentina and Antarctica.

The Everest of ocean sailing is rounding Cape Horn. It’s a famous landmark that is the southernmost headland of the Tierra del Fuego archipelago of southern Chile. It divides the South Pacific with the South Atlantic and is a significant milestone in the voyage.

Part 3 – Cape to Cape

Once around the base of South America it’s due north for some calmer weather and a short rest. As the voyage is non-stop I won’t be pulling into port, so calmer seas and refuge behind land will feel like a holiday. The track will take me close to the Falkland Islands, most probably to the East.

Part 4 – The South Atlantic Ocean to the African continent

Rested and ready I move onto the next passage of unforgiving but rewarding ocean sailing. As the crow flies the southern points of South America and South Africa are about 3,500 nautical miles (6,400 klms) but my track is bound to be a lot more before I reach South Africa.

Part 5 – Rounding South Africa

The Cape of Good Hope is probably the most recognised landmark for southern Atlantic sailors. It’s not the southernmost point of Africa, but sailors that used to travel from the north used this Cape as the point where they could start heading more east. Cape Agulhas is the most southern landmark and divides the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Despite all these capes and geography I won’t be very close to land, in fact I may not even see it. It is however another milestone and getting me much closer to home.

Part 6 – Southern Ocean to Home

From South Africa it’s the vastness of the Southern Ocean. Despite the next continent being Australia there is a lot of sailing to be done. Over 4,000 nautical miles (direct track) of open and often unforgiving seas. Can’t wait. You can have good and bad days in the Southern Ocean, but every one will be memorable.

Entering Australian waters will be a great feeling. Thousands of miles at sea and almost home. Given Australia is the largest island in the world it will take some time to get from Western Australia to my home port of Sydney.

South East Cape is Tasmania’s most southern landmark. From here I head north to the mainland and on to Sydney Harbour. I know I will never be able to prepare myself for the feeling of returning home to family and friends. I am sure that part of my voyage will feel like the longest.

I can’t wait to experience everything the voyage has to offer.

Members will doubtless recall the findings of the court in the Birchall case recently which concerned the question of ‘command’ during a Cook Strait incident. 

As I understand it the case revolved around the question, and legal interpretation of,  ‘Command or control?’ and the Court’s findings were based, as doubtless they had to be, on the wording and interpretation of the Maritime Transport Act 1994. 

I have no difficulty with the judgment which was presumably the only conclusion to which they could come in the circumstances. However, the result is that it is causing New Zealanders to confuse the time honoured, and demonstrably practical, interpretation of the difference between ‘command’ and ‘control’ of a vessel. 

John Brown, when still Master of the Company, made reference to it in writing. Others have done so in private debate and discussion. 

I raise it now because I have read at least twice since then (unfortunately I do not recall where) of the two being confused but as I recall it they were in relatively authoritative statements of whatever was their source. 

I am concerned that the evil is spreading and it’s time to try to put a stop to it. 

I have no difficulty with the concept, of a ship having on board two masters where her operation calls for it (i.e. Cook Strait ferries) so long as there is clear a hand over with entries in both Official and Deck Log Books, and the retiring master is ‘on leave’ aboard the ship — not merely ‘off duty’ — during the period the alternative master is in command. 

As experienced mariners we are very familiar with the concepts of ‘in command’ and ‘in control’. I do not need to elaborate on them here. 

I have not yet attempted to research the many facets of this subject and this is only a preliminary ‘alert’ in the hope that our members and other master mariners in NZ will be willing to take up the issue as being of sufficient important in the operation of ships. 

I do not wish to appear unduly biased in expressing a concern that so much direction of NZ maritime legislation and operation is being driven by an MSA (Maritime New Zealand) which lacks, to a now significant extent, experienced mariners in senior positions whose replacements, understandably, have little understanding of the culture or the practical aspects of the matter. 

I believe that as responsible master mariners we have a duty to speak out and I suspect that the MTA drafters may perhaps have been unclear on this point, possibly from ignorance, and were not deliberately intending to upset the boat. 

I believe, but correct me if I am wrong, that the problem is being brought about by the way in which this subject is framed in the legislation; the MTA being at the heart of the problem. 

I feel sufficiently strongly that, if after proper research and legal opinion, my concern is supported, we should take the matter further with MNZ, and with the Minister of Transport if necessary, with a view of ultimately ensuring the legislation does not erode a clearly understood practice amongst mariners which, when properly handled, removes confusion and adds to maritime safety. 

As a member of the Honourable Company I would be happy to write to its master for an expression of his, and/or the Honourable Company’s, views. Similarly I would happily seek the views of the Nautical Institute too. 

If I am correct in my understanding, and if becomes necessary, I would be pleased to see the NZ Company enlist the support of maritime organizations in the UK and Commonwealth.  

If members share my concern  I think we first need to determine if I am correct in believing this is presently an NZ only, concern arising out of the MTA and the court’s judgment in the Birchall case. 

To this end our Master might care to consult with the Company’s legal advisers and, being Auckland based, might perhaps choose to have a first discussion with the Auckland Branch’s legal adviser to whom I am sending a copy of his memo for his interest.

Warning on increased risk of GPS jamming

Cheap GPS jammers bought off the internet could seriously disrupt busy shipping lanes writes Craig Eason in Lloyds List Tuesday 13 October 2009

NAVIGATION experts are warning about the increasing availability of jamming devices that can render ships without key satellite positioning data.

Experts claim that even the forthcoming European Galileo constellation is no safer from malicious or accidental jamming, as it will use a similar range of frequencies as existing global navigation satellite systems. These include the US Global Position System constellation, Russia’s Glonass and China’s Compass systems.

Electronic transmitters — some smaller than a mobile phone — can be used to disrupt the GPS signals from satellites, leaving equipment such as electronic navigation tools and mandatory vessel monitoring systems all but useless.

There have been official trials that have demonstrated the impact of this simple, readily available equipment, which can be used maliciously to disrupt shipping. These include tests last year by Trinity House, the UK’s lighthouse authority responsible for aids to navigation. It managed to send a jamming signal from a UK headland and destroy GPS signals on one of its vessels 20 nm away.

Satellite and communications consultant David Last advises organisations such as the Royal Institute of Navigation about the increased risk of malicious jamming.

He said UK police were aware of an escalated criminal tendency to use jammers bought off the internet. They are being used to help steal high-value cars or expensive freight loads with built-in GPS tracking.

In a number of cases, the small jammers were plugged into the cigarette lighter socket of a car that was then put in a container and shipped out of the country. Consequently, those onboard the vessel were unaware of the presence of an active jammer that could produce GPS signal distortions.

When technical experts at UK’s General Lighthouse Authority performed jamming trials on one of its vessels, Pole Star , last year they were shocked at the impact onboard the vessel.

GPS provides position, navigational direction and, most vitally for many industries as well as maritime, time keeping. It is a key input into the Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems that the shipping community has been told to install on all its ships over the next nine years.

Timing gives Ecdis the accurate positions, helps drive the gyro compasses and is the key position and time producer for the data included in mandatory transmissions in automatic identification signals and long-range identification and tracking.

“We had AIS tracks doing 1,000 knots over land,” said Trinity House deputy master Jeremy de Halpert.

The test led to confusion and pandemonium on the bridge of the vessel. “All the alarms went off — not just some, but nearly all of them,” he added. Vessel systems relying on the GPS signal became unreliable and the level of automation on the vessel threatened to leave it out of control.

Rear Adm De Halpert said the bridge team found it difficult to navigate and respond to the bridge alarms and systems losses at the same time. The gyro compass was erratic, so there was no accurate heading indication, the auto pilot threatened to change course and the crew were concerned that the engine systems would be impacted.

This test occurred when the crew was expecting the disruption and there was more than one person on the bridge. A solitary navigating officer on the bridge of a modern vessel could be at a loss responding to the continual alarms, rather than attempting to understand the cause of the disruption.

Jamming is not always deliberate. There have been incidents of unintentional jamming — one of the Trinity House vessels reported a fault in the VHF aerial that inadvertently jammed the GPS signal until it was discovered two days later.

GPS jamming also has implications for banking and trading, which are reliant on precise time keeping. Other systems that could be seriously adversely affected by a jammed GPS signal are the National Grid, mobile phones and hospitals.

In 2007, there was a major jamming incident at the port of San Diego. A US Coast Guard investigation found that it was caused by a US Navy vessel, which was taking part in a communications exercise. It inadvertently jammed the GPS signals for two hours across the harbour and city.

“Because GPS is the principal system for synchronising telecommunication systems, they lost 150 mobile phone cells around the city, as well as affecting all the ships in the port,” said Prof Last.

Hospital pagers failed to work and aviation GPS systems were also said to be affected, he added.

Experts say GPS equipment is susceptible to jamming because of the weak signal ground receiving stations, such as a mobile phone network or a ship navigation system, obtain from a distant satellite. The Trinity House trial used a jammer producing only 1.5 watts to create a 20 nm disruption zone.

Prof Last, Rear Adm de Halpert and other experts are concerned that the shipping industry is placing a huge dependence on a sole means of position determination that is proven to be easily fallible, yet are refusing to take the risks seriously.

“We know there is a major vulnerability. It is a bit like the first computer viruses, which were out there and no one was worried,” said Prof Last.

Trinity House plan to run a similar GPS disruption test in December in northeast England, in a bid to make industry and government more keenly aware of the issues, said Trinity House and General Lighthouse Authority director of research and radio navigation Sally Basker.

This test would use a much smaller jamming device to prevent systems off the vessel being affected, but will demonstrate the severity of the situation, Ms Basker added.

While the Trinity House tests have used relatively small jamming devices to minimise disruption, Prof Last warned that the bigger systems on the market could cause disruption over an area of more than 300 sq km.

If such a signal is used maliciously close to Dover it could create havoc in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world and could render the AIS signals received by the local traffic control centres as meaningless.

The proof that GPS is fallible also comes with reports that the US-controlled GPS constellation is likely to suffer over the next five years as the number of active satellites drops by 20% during a renewal and maintenance period. This could render a drop in the accuracy of the signals.

Trinity House, with support from the French and Norwegians, has been promoting e-Loran as a useful back-up for GPS.

While Rear Adm de Halpert recognises that GPS is normally both reliable and accurate, he is pushing to get countries to support the development of e-Loran, a land-based system that sends out a signal similar to GPS.

Although any radio signal could be jammed, according to Ms Basker, it would be much harder to jam an e-Loran signal as it is 10,000 times stronger and cannot be drowned out as easily as the much weaker GPS signal.

“It is the difference in power between a 100 watt light bulb and a rock concert in your back garden,” Ms Basker added.